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The SECURE project is investigating the de-
sign of security mechanisms for pervasive com-
puting based on the human notion of trust. Our
work addresses how entities that encounter each
other in unfamiliar, pervasive computing envi-
ronments can overcome initial suspicion to allow
secure collaboration to take place.
1 Overview
At present most substantial, accountable com-
putation is carried out by registered parties op-
erating behind firewalls in strictly controlled en-
vironments. On the other hand, pervasive com-
puting foresees a massively networked infras-
tructure supporting a large population of diverse
but cooperating entities. Entities will be both
autonomous and mobile and will have to be ca-
pable of dealing with unforeseen circumstances
ranging from unexpected interactions with other
entities to disconnected operation. These prop-
erties of the pervasive computing infrastructure
introduce new security challenges that are not
adequately addressed by existing security mod-
els and mechanisms. The scale of the pervasive
computing infrastructure means that security
policy must encompass billions of potential col-
laborators. Mobile entities are likely to become
disconnected from their home network, there-
fore they require the ability to make fully au-
tonomous security decisions; they cannot rely on
a specific security infrastructure such as certifi-
cate authorities and authorisation servers. Al-
though certificate authorities may be used to
establish the identity of other collaborators reli-
ably, in the environment envisaged identity con-
veys no a priori information about the likely be-
havior of the principal. Identity alone therefore
cannot be used for access control decisions, i.e.
all participants are virtually anonymous. The
dynamism of the pervasive computing infras-
tructure means that entities which offer services
will be confronted with requests from entities
that they have never met before; mobile entities
will need to obtain services within environments
that are unfamiliar and possibly hostile. A party
faced with such a complex world stands to ben-
efit, but only if it can respond to new entities
and assign meaningful privileges to them.
The general goal of our work is therefore to
investigate the design of a novel approach to
security that addresses the challenges outlined
above. If successful, this approach will offer sig-
nificant benefits not only for future systems but
also in the context of a range of emerging appli-
cations in the mobile computing arena as well
as for collaboration over the existing Internet in
situations where both the identities and inten-
tions of correspondents are difficult to establish
with certainty.
Our approach is based on the application of
the human notion of trust. This leads naturally
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to a decentralised approach to security manage-
ment that can tolerate partial information, al-
beit one in which there is an inherent element
of risk for the trusting entity. Fundamentally,
it is the ability to reason about trust and risk
that allows entities to accept risk when they are
interacting with other entities. Hence, the cen-
tral problem to be addressed by the SECURE
project is to provide entities with a basis for rea-
soning about trust and risk embodied in a com-
putational framework that can be adapted to a
variety of application scenarios. Underlying this
framework is a formal computational model of
trust that will provide the formal basis for rea-
soning about trust and for the deployment of
verifiable security policies.
By way of example, consider the problem of
routing messages in an ad hoc wireless network.
An entity, i.e. a mobile node, with a message
to send must rely on other nodes located on
the path to the intended destination to forward
its message. In the general case, the interme-
diate nodes may have no a priori relationship
or agreement with the sender, whom they may
never have encountered previously. Moreover,
forwarding messages has a cost in terms of bat-
tery and processing power. Why then should a
sender rely on such nodes to act on its behalf? If
multiple paths exist, in which path should the
sender have most confidence? Fundamentally,
these decisions are trusting decisions informed
by the degree to which the sender trusts the in-
termediate nodes to “do the right thing” based
on its observation and past experience of the
nodes concerned, their reputations, and possi-
bly recommendations from third parties. These
decisions are also mediated by the risk being
taken. Less trust is probably needed to send a
message of low importance, more for a message
of higher importance that really needs to arrive!
2 Understanding trust
Trust is a phenomenon that humans use ev-
ery day to promote interaction and accept risk
in situations where only partial information is
available, allowing one person to assume that
another will behave as expected. Despite the
extensive study of trust in the social sciences,
i.e. sociology, psychology and philosophy, it re-
mains an elusive concept, which defies stringent
definition. This is due in part to trust being
largely invisible and implicit in society. A wide
variety of definitions of trust have been put for-
ward [9], many of which are dependent on the
context in which trust is examined, or the view-
point that the author adopts. It is this mul-
tifaceted characteristic of trust which makes it
difficult to form a unified definition.
To begin with it is useful to examine dictio-
nary definitions of trust to determine those that
are widely accepted. Common to these defini-
tions are the notions of confidence, belief, faith,
hope, expectation, dependence and reliance on
the integrity, ability, or character of a person or
thing. The variety of common terms given here
demonstrates the lack of precise definition and
hints at the range of different views of trust. As
further examples from the literature, Gambetta
[5] introduces trust as “a particular level of the
subjective probability with which an agent as-
sesses that another agent or a group of agents
will perform a particular action, both before
he can monitor such action (or independently
of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it)
and in a context in which it affects his own ac-
tion”. Deutsch’s work [3] considers trust when
faced with an ambiguous path with beneficial
or harmful results dependent on another per-
son. He identifies a wide variety of types of
trust, ranging from trust as the fallback when
no other option is available to trust as confi-
dence whereby the trustor has confidence that
the desired outcome will be reached. Deutsch
suggests that trusting actions are taken when
the likelihood of being let down is outweighed
by the possible benefits, which suggests that risk
analysis forms an important part of the decision
to trust. Due to these and many other views ex-
pressed in the literature, Marsh [8] reasons that
it may prove more suitable to attempt to model
the behaviour of trust rather than trust itself,
removing the need to adhere to specific defini-
tions.
An important observation from all these
sources is that trust is a subjective notion, be-
ing an individual’s opinion of another individ-
ual, and thus every individual makes its own
decision to trust or not based on the evidence
available for personal evaluation (although an
individual may be prepared to delegate this de-
cision to a more authoritative source in certain
circumstances). Moreover, trust is not symmet-
ric which implies that two individuals do not
need to have similar trust in each other. Even
if two entities are presented with the same ev-
idence they may not necessarily interpret this
2
information in the same way.
Trust is also situation-specific such that trust
in one environment does not directly transfer to
another environment and as a result a notion of
context is necessary. Despite this situational na-
ture, there is some agreement on a dispositional
aspect of trust as a measure of one’s propensity
to believe in the trustworthiness of others.
The literature also highlights the dynamic
properties of trust in that trust is self-preserving
and self-amplifying, increasing through periodic
successful interactions and degrading through
disuse or misuse.
Trust is inherently linked to risk; there is no
reason to trust if there is no risk involved. This
relationship implies that higher risk means co-
operation is less likely to occur, unless the bene-
fits of interaction are worth the risk. Reasoning
about trust therefore allows entities to accept
risk when they are interacting with others.
The approach taken in the SECURE project
is based around the premise that trust and risk
are inexorably linked and must both be consid-
ered when taking a decision about an ambiguous
path, the outcome of which depends on the ac-
tions of another entity.
2.1 The trust model
Note to the editor: This section could be in-
cluded as a sidebar to the article.
The aim of the trust model [1] is to pro-
vide formal techniques for studying properties
of trust based systems. Our formal model fo-
cuses on the set T , the set of trust values, whose
elements represent degrees of trust. The set T
has two orderings  and v such that (T ,) is a
complete lattice and (T ,v) is a complete partial
order, with a bottom element. The ordering 
reflects the notion of “more trust” saying that
a particular trust value may represent a higher
level of trust than another, whereas the order-
ing v reflects information saying that a partic-
ular trust value may contain more information
than another. In a setting with a huge num-
ber of interacting principals it is unreasonable
to assume that every principal has precise infor-
mation, or even any information at all, about
every other principal. For instance principals
will often have to act on requests from unknown
principals. The element ⊥v represents the value
unknown. In this setting it is important to dis-
tinguish this element from ⊥, which represents
no trust : the former is interpreted as having no
evidence for trust or distrust, whereas the lat-
ter implies an explicit reason for distrusting the
particular principal.
In [1] we give a technique for building the
triple (T ,,v) starting with a complete lattice,
(D,≤), and considering the set of intervals of
type [d0, d1], over D. The ordering  will be a
natural lifting of ≤ to these intervals. The v
order considers the “width” of intervals, which
can be thought of as representing the amount
of uncertainty, i.e. the real trust value is some-
where in that interval, but we are not sure ex-
actly where.
A simple example could be starting with
the complete lattice of reals ([0, 1],≤). The
intervals of this lattice are the sub-intervals
of [0, 1] (where [0, 1] denotes complete uncer-
tainty). The interval [.3, .6] could represent the
trust a principal a has in principal b with uncer-
tainty 0.6 − 0.3 = 0.3. It could be, eventually,
that a receives more information about b so it
will be able to give a more precise judgment,
e.g., narrowing the value to [.33, .6].
Now given a set of principals P and the set T
we can see trust information as a function:
m : P −→ P −→ T
The function m applied to a, applied to b is the
trust value m(a)(b) ∈ T expressing a’s trust in
b.
Furthermore every principal has a local policy
which is its contribution to the global trust in-
formation. It expresses how the principal plans
to compute trust information. The model can
handle the concept of delegation, which in this
setting, means that a principal may refer to an-
other principal’s trust information. This means
that every principal may express its trust in an-
other principal, not just in terms of its own be-
liefs, but also in terms of the beliefs of other
principals. Given a ∈ P , the policy pia can be
seen as a function of the following type:
pia : (P −→ P −→ T ) −→ (P −→ T )
This function takes “the current trust infor-
mation about all principals” (function m) and
returns a function which expresses a’s trust in a
given principal1.
1In [1] we provide a language for expressing such pol-
icy functions.
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The collection of all local policies induces a
global policy function2:
Π : (P −→ P −→ T ) −→ (P −→ P −→ T )
As an important general assumption we re-
quire that Π is a v-continuous function. In-
tuitively this is a reasonable assumption: it
amounts to requiring that all policies should sat-
isfy the fact that “the more information is pro-
vided by other principals, the more information
is provided by the policy”. From this assump-
tion the global trust information is safely defined
as the least fixed point of Π.
3 Handling trusted interac-
tions
The trust needed for an interaction depends on
the risk involved. This gives appropriate secu-
rity in pervasive environments, without calling
for excessive trust in straightforward cases.
When a system grants privileges to a princi-
pal it is with the expectation that they will use
them in a particular manner, for example, to
update outdated address book entries with ac-
curate information. There is, however, also the
possibility that the principal will deviate from
this expected behaviour, and the combined like-
lihood and severity of this is the risk of granting
them a privilege.
In SECURE , the risks of a trust-mediated ac-
tion are decomposed by possible outcomes. The
risk of an outcome depends on the trustworthi-
ness of the other principal (the likelihood), and
on the outcome’s intrinsic cost. For example, an
address update might be out of date itself, or
maliciously misleading: the costs of these two
outcomes would reflect the user’s wasted time,
while the likelihoods would depend on trust in
the other party.
The costs of an outcome may span a range of
values. For example, a third outcome in the ex-
ample might be receiving a correct phone book
entry; the outcome’s cost could show a net ben-
efit to the user, as the number might be used
successfully later. However, if the number had
become out of date by the time it was used, that
would be a net loss. To reflect this uncertainty,
2The induced function is
Π′ : P −→ (P −→ P −→ T ) −→ (P −→ T )
which is equivalent to the given one.
the distribution of costs may be represented as
a cost-PDF.
Figure 1 illustrates a user contemplating a pa-
rameterized interaction with principal p. For
each possible outcome, the user has a parame-
terized cost-PDF (a family of cost-PDFs) which
represents the range of possible costs and ben-
efits the user might incur, should each outcome
occur.
While the risk evaluator is assessing the possi-
ble cost-PDFs, the trust calculator provides in-
formation t which determines the likelihood of
the risk, based on the principal’s identity p and
the other parameters of the action. This trust
information is then used to select the appropri-
ate cost-PDF.
The cost-PDFs of all the outcomes are fi-
nally combined by the request analyser, to de-
cide whether to allow the action to be taken, or
to arrange further interaction. Since any uncer-
tainty is preserved right up to the decision point,
this allows more complex decision making than
simple thresholding — allowing responses such
as “not sure” if there is not enough information.
In our continuing example, if Liz’s PDA re-
ceived a phone number from Vinny’s PDA, she
might consider it very unlikely to be maliciously
misleading, based on her trust in Vinny’s hon-
esty. She might however think it could be out
of date, if Vinny had given her stale information
before, attributing a higher risk to this outcome.
Finally, she would consider the potential benefit
of having a correct number, again moderated by
Vinny’s trustworthiness. Liz’s PDA would per-
form all these calculations on her behalf using
its model of her trust beliefs, as illustrated in
Figure 2. If the benefits outweighed the cost of
the other outcomes, the PDA would then choose
to accept the information.
Out of date
Correct
Malicious
probability
benefit (£)
Combined Cost−PDF
cost (£)
Figure 2: Illustration of risk analysis.
On the other hand, if Jon (a colleague from a
competing research group — in the cutthroat
world of academia) sent Liz an address book
entry, her PDA might reject it after the same
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Figure 1: The interface between trust and risk.
analysis, because she did not know him. At this
point, the request analyser might seek out more
information, e.g. by discovering that Jon works
with Jean, who is trusted by Liz, or by inter-
rupting Liz for confirmation [13].
This explicit risk analysis therefore balances
the evidence that a principal is trustworthy
against the risks if they are not. This allows
sensible behaviour in the face of uncertainty but
prevents abuse, since trust assessments are in-
crementally updated as more evidence becomes
available.
3.1 Building trust
Fundamentally, trusting decisions are based on
trust information, encompassing evidence from
personal observations derived from monitoring
previous interactions and on recommendations
from partly-trusted third parties. These two
main sources of stored trust information allow
us to dynamically form an opinion about an-
other entity.
Personal observations of the entity’s be-
haviour, through recording outcomes of inter-
actions, are essential for the subjective evalua-
tion of trustworthiness. Observations of the out-
comes of interactions are evaluated against the
expected behaviour of the principal, to produce
experiences [7]. The range of experience values
reflects the effect of the observed outcome rela-
tive to the expected outcome, usually in terms of
gain or loss. These values are ordered and are
classified into two sets, a trust positive and a
trust negative one. This evidence is aggregated
with the evidence from previous interactions to
give a comprehensive summary of the interac-
tion history related to a specific entity.
Recommendations from trustworthy third
parties enable the propagation of trust in un-
known entities, to provide supporting evidence
for decisions. The process of recommenda-
tion becomes more important when the trust
evaluation based on observations is not precise
enough. In such cases, further information may
be needed. Similarly, imprecise recommenda-
tions could be discarded as they provide little
additional information. The decision on this is-
sue, however, is left to the individual entity.
Upon receiving a collaboration request, we
can dynamically filter the available trust evi-
dence to retain only that relevant to the re-
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quested action. If no evidence is available for an
entity from experience or recommendation we
must establish an initial trust value to encourage
low risk collaborations. This initial trust value
can be determined using a number of strategies,
outlined in [4]. This collaboration will provide
further evidence upon which to base future trust
formation. If there is enough evidence to reason
about the entity’s trustworthiness, then obser-
vation and recommendation will be evaluated
to yield trust information. This trust informa-
tion may be multidimensional, in that separate
trust intervals (see Section 2.1) may be formed
for different aspects of trust in the interaction.
Recommendation evidence is treated separately
from evidence based on personal experience as
the latter has a greater influence on trust.
The trust model outlined earlier operates us-
ing local trust policies. These local policies
allow the use of collected evidence, and dic-
tate the conditions under which this opinion
of trust formed from evidence should be used.
The policies also allow conditional delegation
of trust evaluation to an outside entity, an im-
portant feature of the trust model. The differ-
ence between recommendation and delegation is
that we delegate to similar entities to ourselves,
which we may consider to be expert for the pur-
pose of the decision; however, in recommenda-
tion we gather trust information from any prin-
cipal in the environment, and more than one
recommendation may be sought. Recommen-
dations may also be weighted according to our
trust in the source as a recommender.
4 Software framework
Even if we understand how to reason about trust
formation and evolution, as well as how to ex-
ploit trust in making access control decisions, we
need also to ensure that the algorithms required
for these processes can be feasibly implemented
in heterogeneous systems. In this regard, we
are developing a framework encompassing algo-
rithms for trust management. Figure 3 illus-
trates the current version of our framework de-
sign.
When a request for interaction is made by a
principal, p, it passes through the API into the
request analyser. The request analyser requests
information about p from three sources, the en-
tity recognition component, the trust calculator,
and the risk evaluator.
Verification that p is recognized is requested
from the entity recognition component (see side-
bar), which is responsible for recognizing new
or previously encountered entities. The entity
recognition component may be consulted by any
of the other components to provide recognition
capabilities as necessary.
Additionally, the request analyser requests a
trust calculation from the trust calculator. The
trust calculator computes the least fixed point,
as discussed above, using information gathered
from the trust lifecycle management component
and its local trust policy. As discussed above,
the process of calculating a trust level for p may
be delegated to another entity, thereby initiat-
ing synchronous communication with a remote
entity.
The trust calculator ’s local policy is updated
based on information fed from the trust lifecycle
management component. This component han-
dles the formation, evolution, and exploitation
of trust based on data drawn from the evidence
store. The policy for trust lifecycle management
allows the weighting of trust information accord-
ing to context-specific criteria.
The evidence store is where all trust- and risk-
related data are stored. The evidence store is
updated with data collected from evidence gath-
ering, such as recommendations and security up-
dates collected in an asynchronous process, and
from the monitoring component. The evidence
store is also responding to request for recom-
mendations from other entities.
The monitoring component observes actual
interaction with p, as well as conveying the re-
sults of such interaction to the evidence store.
The request analyser also requests a risk as-
sessment from the risk evaluator. The risk eval-
uator calculates the potential risk of the request,
based on the local information stored in the risk
configuration component, which is updated with
information from the evidence store.
All of the information obtained about p is as-
sessed and aggregated. The trust calculation
and risk assessment are returned to the request
analyser. The request analyser is then able to
provide a decision to p regarding possible inter-
action.
4.1 Entity recognition
Note to the editor: This section could be in-
cluded as a sidebar to the article.
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Figure 3: The framework for one party to a computing interaction. (Large arrows signify data
flows, and thin arrows signify control flows.)
It has been observed that authentication in
pervasive computing systems is not necessarily
enough to ensure security, because identity con-
veys no a priori information about the likely be-
haviour of the other entity [2? ]. Entity recogni-
tion (ER) [12] has been proposed as a more gen-
eral replacement for authentication, which does
not bind an identity to the recognised entity,
i.e. authentication is a special case of recogni-
tion that binds an externally visible identity to
the recognised entity. We conjecture that the
ability to reliably recognise another entity is suf-
ficient to establish trust in that entity based on
past experiences and entity recognition provides
a local reference to this basis for trust, which is
in turn maintained by other components in the
SECURE framework.
The SECURE framework includes an en-
tity recognition component based on Pluggable
Recognition Modules (PRM), which allows the
integration of more or less secure recognition
schemes, e.g. traditional authentication mod-
ules developed for PAM [10] or pure recognition
based schemes, such as APER [12], which uses
signed claims broadcast periodically on a net-
work to recognise entities. The accuracy of a
particular recognition scheme must be assessed
and a level of confidence associated with the
outcome of the recognition process, e.g. the av-
erage attack space [14] of recognition schemes
could give an upper bound for the confidence
in a particular recognition scheme. APER pro-
vides three levels of confidence depending on
how much verification is applied to the claims,
i.e. signature validation and/or claim freshness
and/or challenge/response.
5 Applications
Note to the editor: One of the applications could
be omitted to save space.
Given the exploratory nature of the project,
it is important to evaluate the proposed mech-
anisms in the context of real applications. This
section overviews three applications that are be-
ing worked on by the consortium. Each appli-
cation deals with a large number of interacting
entities, entities that interact may be strangers,
and one cannot rely on the presence of a cen-
tralized service for security. Despite the hetero-
geneity of these applications, we are currently
developing instantiations of the framework pre-
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sented earlier that will be used to support each
of these applications.
5.1 Ad hoc routing
An ad hoc network has no fixed infrastructure,
and the lack of implicitly trusted routers means
that each node becomes part of the routing fab-
ric. Routing in such a network relies on nodes
correctly forwarding packets, yet in general, the
intermediate nodes may have no prior contact
with the sender. The undetected presence of
nodes which are selfish, malicious or even unre-
liable can seriously impede the routing abilities
of other nodes.
The trust model allows the routing protocol
to identify and avoid untrustworthy nodes and
links. Here, we mean untrustworthy in their
ability to forward (and carry, in the case of links)
packets, hence this includes both malicious and
simply faulty or unreliable principals.
Being able to reason about the trustworthi-
ness of routes has many interesting applications.
We are applying our model as an extension to
the dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol, in a
prototype open urban ad hoc network, currently
being deployed in Dublin. The network contains
fixed nodes (on street lamps) and mobile nodes
(for example, PDAs) which provide additional
but transient routing infrastructure. These pub-
lic mobile nodes can move out of range, lose
power or even be malicious or selfish, and using
our trust model, these will be assigned low trust
values and hence will be avoided by other nodes
wishing to route packets in the system. Routes
need to be chosen nondeterministically (in pro-
portion to their trustworthiness) to avoid over-
loading the static nodes which form the back-
bone of the infrastructure, so providing a form
of trust-based load balancing.
Nodes can only observe aggregate properties
of routes (not of individual nodes), yet we would
like to be able to reason about the trustworthi-
ness of previously unseen routes, so each node
performs a two stage local computation:
1. Observe. A node makes a series of obser-
vations on a route. Each observation is the
result of a packet transmission, represent-
ing either success or failure (indicated by a
route error packet);
2. Infer. Using the route observation and the
current trustworthiness of nodes, a node at-
tempts to infer the most likely new trust
values of nodes. This is done by estimating
the actual packet-level behaviour of nodes
which minimizes the mean-squared error,
given the current knowledge.
Nodes can increase their knowledge of the net-
work by the use of recommendations. A node
makes a recommendation by piggybacking some
of its observations about routes onto the “route
discovery” packets sent in the network. The re-
ceiving node could simply handle these obser-
vations as if they were its own, but for a small
caveat: what if the node making the recommen-
dation had lied, in an attempt to subvert the
network?
In handling false recommendations we make
a simplifying assumption: nodes are rational
in that they make true recommendations if
they forward packets (and are trustworthy),
but may make false recommendations if they
do not (in an attempt to justify their misbe-
haviour). Hence the trustworthiness of a node
is an appropriate factor with which to discount
its recommendations. The result is that, rather
than blindly exchanging routing table entries,
nodes can discount these recommendations, tak-
ing into account the trustworthiness of other
nodes and, recursively, their discounted rec-
ommendations. This allows trustworthy nodes
to propagate information about untrustworthy
nodes, whilst preventing untrustworthy nodes
from slandering trustworthy nodes.
Nodes in a wireless network often have lim-
ited battery power, so energy conservation is an
important topic when considering routing deci-
sions. In a sense, the risk to a node of sending
a packet along a particular route is proportional
to the energy needed to make the first hop, and
the probability of that energy being wasted (if
the packet is not successfully sent). Since our
trust values represent a meaningful quantity,
i.e. the probability of a successful transmission,
then the inverse represents the expected num-
ber of retransmissions, assuming retries are to
the same node (although more complex schemes
can be handled). We can therefore say that trust
mediates the energy risks in wireless routing.
In summary, the SECURE approach gives
nodes in an ad hoc network the ability to rea-
son explicitly about their routing decisions, us-
ing trust to mediate the risks involved. More
details can be found in [15].
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5.2 Collaborative gaming
There is increasing demand for applications like
collaborative gaming, where players in different
locations can participate in the same gaming
session using portable devices. This leads to a
need for security measures, as unknown and po-
tentially untrustworthy players may enter gam-
ing sessions. For example, blackjack is a popular
card game in which players gamble with a dealer
over the value of a set of cards. In our proto-
type implementation, people play blackjack over
a mobile ad hoc network, using laptop comput-
ers or PDAs.
For example, suppose Alice takes the 8am
commuter train into the city to work every week-
day morning. To pass the time, she wishes to
play an interactive game, and she joins an ad
hoc wireless network to see what collaborative
gaming applications are available. She discov-
ers an ongoing blackjack session in which Bob
is the dealer, and she requests admission to the
game. Bob must decide whether or not to admit
Alice to the game, i.e. he must decide whether
or not he recognizes Alice, how much he trusts
her as a gaming opponent, and how much risk
is associated in playing blackjack with her.
The process of entity recognition determines
whether or not Bob has interacted with Alice
before, as well as the level of confidence in the
recognition of Alice. If this is the first time Bob
has interacted with Alice, he may need to rely on
recommendations from other trusted parties to
provide information about Alice. Recommenda-
tions may be exchanged verbally, by e-mail, by
distributed post-its, etc., and then recorded as
evidence.
Based on evidence from his own observations,
and/or from recommendations about Alice, Bob
can determine a trust level for Alice. Bob needs
to trust that Alice will not cheat, spoof, or col-
lude while he is gaming with her. This is the
same trust that is required in the casino version
of blackjack. Additionally, because in black-
jack the dealer’s odds of winning are more fa-
vorable than the players’, the entity holding the
dealer role must be considered trustworthy by
the other players. Looking at this from another
angle, the right to assume the advantageous
dealer role can be seen as a privilege earned
through fair, trustworthy playing of the game.
Should Alice want to enter a game as a dealer,
she will need to prove some level of trustworthi-
ness.
Information, such as what sort of playing
strategy Alice typically uses, whether she has
a high win rate, or whether she pays off her
gambling debts, provides evidence for determin-
ing Alice’s trustworthiness. This information
may also help determine the risk of interacting
with Alice. For example, information regarding
what players are typically playing in games in
which Alice is playing may lead to Bob being
able to reason about the probability that Alice
will collude with other players. This informa-
tion can be monitored throughout the course
of interaction, whereby the results of playing
blackjack with Alice are evaluated and stored,
or gathered from other sources, such as in the
recommendation example above. Bob may also
need to respond to requests for recommenda-
tions from other players with relevant evidence
he has stored.
Bob may wish to delegate his trusting deci-
sion altogether. In this case, he must engage
in recognition of remote entities with whom he
may interact for the purpose of delegation.
Based on the aggregation of all of this infor-
mation, Bob is able to assess whether he recog-
nizes Alice, to what extent he is certain of his
recognition of Alice, how much he trusts Alice,
and whether or not that trust level is enough to
interact with Alice given the overall risk inher-
ent in the interaction.
Initial results of tests with the prototype im-
plementation [6] show that it reacts correctly to
changes in an entity’s interactive behaviour, i.e.
adjusts trust levels and implements trust-based
interaction accurately as trust rises and falls.
5.3 Electronic commerce
Electronic purses, or e-purses, are used to per-
mit people to exchange small sums of money.
They avoid the need for carrying physical notes
and coins by representing money in electronic
form. The e-purse uses a smart-card to prevent
user tampering. Payment involves the exchange
of data between devices and usually involves a
specialized terminal reader device. Payments
are often termed micro-payments since the sums
of money involved are generally small.
Work has now started to use the mobile tele-
phone as an e-purse, with the smart-card stor-
ing the sum of money and the functions for
debiting and crediting the sum. Payment be-
tween devices is done using SMS (Short Mes-
sage Service). The phone’s purse can be loaded
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by SMS or by a client-server dialog with the
bank over a GSM connection. Another possibil-
ity for person-to-person payment is to use Blue-
tooth. Many telephones now possess Bluetooth
and this can be used for exchanging sums be-
tween telephone purses. The advantage of the
Bluetooth solution over the SMS approach is
that Bluetooth is an operator-less network, and
so data exchange costs nothing.
The example we consider here consists of a
user wishing to pay for a bus ticket using his e-
purse. The user enters the bus and initiates the
procedure of purchasing a bus ticket by send-
ing a message to the bus’s purse (payment ma-
chine). The machine replies and asks for the
payment. The e-purse is then activated and the
smart-card removes the bus ticket amount from
the e-purse.
E-money and exchanges of e-money among
the users and the bank are currently be-
ing implemented according to the e-cash algo-
rithm [11]. This algorithm defines a format for
the e-money, and a cryptographic protocol for
e-money exchanges. Roughly, a client wishing
to download some e-money into his e-purse con-
tacts his bank and receives a certified e-money
ticket that he can use for paying a vendor. The
vendor is able to verify the integrity of the e-
note, but is unable to determine the identity of
the client. At a later stage, the vendor submits
the e-note to the bank, which checks that the
e-note is not a fake, and credits the vendor’s
account.
The e-cash algorithm is a means for certify-
ing the money stored on a device. It alone is
not a guarantee of security, due to the risk of
an e-purse being tampered with by its owner.
In addition, trust is required in cases where the
vendor is unable to verify the money immedi-
ately. The security framework defined by SE-
CURE consists of several modules present in
each principal’s e-purse.
First, the collaboration module of the bus re-
ceives a collaboration request from the user (see
Figure 3). The bus identifies the client through
the Entity Recognition Scheme. It then begins
reasoning about the client using the stored evi-
dence. In the case where there is already some
information about the client, the bus enters into
trust calculation and risk assessment. If there
is no information yet about the client, the bus
looks for a recommendation. Several choices are
available for the bus once it has obtained the
result of the trust calculation or the recommen-
dation:
• if there is no trust, it will ask the client for
e-money; or even for true money,
• if there is high trust, it can even give credit,
recording this for future collection.
• The interaction is then monitored and eval-
uated, and new evidence stored.
The risk calculation in the e-purse example
consists of determining for each action the pos-
sible outcomes, and their associated cost. For
instance, from the point of view of the bus com-
pany, when a user wants to board a bus, it must
make a decision based on whether the user has
sufficient money to cover the cost of the jour-
ney, or whether the e-money may turn out to
be forged.
6 Conclusions
The SECURE project is investigating the design
of security mechanisms for pervasive computing
based on the human notion of trust. The ap-
plication of human trust to security leads nat-
urally to a decentralised approach to security
management that can tolerate partial informa-
tion and uncertainty. The central contribution
of SECURE is to provide entities with a basis
for reasoning about trust and risk embodied in a
computational framework that can be adapted
to a variety of application scenarios. Underlying
this framework is a formal computational model
of trust that provides the formal basis for rea-
soning about trust and for the deployment of
verifiable security policies.
Currently, we are continuing to refine the de-
sign of the framework and, in particular, our ap-
proach to trust formation and evolution to ad-
dress issues such as collusion and framing. We
are also examining the application of trust to
role-based access control.
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